On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 06:41:21PM +0200, Christoph Trassl wrote:
> On 10/25/2011 05:30 PM, Till Maas wrote:
> > On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 01:45:45PM +0200, Christoph Trassl wrote:
> >> On 10/25/2011 09:33 AM, Michal Hlavinka wrote:
> >>> On 10/25/2011 09:30 AM, Harald Hoyer wrote:
> >>>> On 10/25/2011 09:15 AM, Harald Hoyer wrote:
> >>>>> It's not only an aesthetic issue. This enables
> >>>>> possibilities, which were not doable before.
> >>> ...
> >>>> - mount rootfs encrypted - mount /usr not encrypted (no secrets
> >>>> here)
> >>> this is already possible, I use this setup for a long time.
> >> Does not seem to make any sense to me, unless you verify that no
> >> one has messed with your binaries/libraries in /usr.
> > Does not seem to make any sense to me, unless you verify that no one
> > has messed with your kernel/bootloader in /boot or /dev/sda.
> Verifying the kernel/bootloader could easily been done within seconds -
> at every boot.
Yet as long as it is not done, encrypting /usr is no improvement. And
even if it is done, you would also need to verify that nobody installed
a keyboard logger on your device if your fear attackers that have easily
physical access to the device in question.