I still have a hard time seeing the value of this criterion.
There's no reason why everyone should want the same thing from a voting
It's entirely up to you whether SFC, one wording of which I'll copy here,
appeals to you or not:
>For SFC-complying methods, if falsification doesn't occur on a
>Any sincere-voting majority is guaranteed that no one whom they all like
>less than the CW will win.
>[end of alternative SFC definition]
Perhaps you don't care if someone you like less than the CW wins, and of
course that is entirely up to you.
A profile is a profile.
I doubt that anyone would disagree with you there. But what is a profile? A
profile of what?
Judging by what you say below, you're talking about a configuration of
It doesn't matter if the reason for the votes
was honest, strategic
But that depends on the criterion, doesn't it. Some criteria stipulate
sincere voting for some voters. Some criteria speak of certain voters not
falsifying or reversing a preference. For those criteria, it does matter
whether those voters' voting is sincere, reversed, or falsified,
Now, of course whether or not those criteria matter to you is entirely
another matter, as is the matter of whether it matters to me which criteria
, or if the voter's mothers told them what to do.
I will not criticize your way of deciding how to vote, whatever it may be.
If you vote as your mother tells you to, then your voting may well be not
sincere, as I define the term. I've defined that term on EM a number of
time, and it can be found at:
Once the votes are cast, a criterion helps determine who can &
cannot reasonable win.
All criteria have requirements involving the outcome. Some criteria refer
only to votes that are cast. Some refer to preferences, directly or
indirectly when speaking of voting that is sincere, unreversed, or
I encourage you to assert your freedom to prefer whatever criteria you want
So both the original definition and this revised one seem to reduce to
the Smith criterion.
No, not really.
But I've already pointed out that SFC could be called Condorcet's Criterion
for majorities, because it offers a guarantee to a majority, stipulating
only that they vote sincerely, whereas Condorcet's Criterion makes a
guarantee to no one in particular, stipulating that everyone vote sincerely.
Smith's Criterion is different from Condorcet's Criterion. But GSFC could be
called Smith's Criterion for majorities.