brief comment about your second problem which I hope is helpful.
You state in your “Introduction to the MOQ”:
Mathematics in the Intellectual Level”
In a 2003 letter to Paul Turner,
Pirsig includes mathematics in the intellectual level of LILA. He writes:
'“Intellect” can [...] be defined
very loosely as the level of independently manipulable signs. Grammar, logic
and mathematics can be described as the rules of this sign manipulation.'
'…it seems to me the greatest meaning
can be given to the intellectual level if it is confined to the skilled
manipulation of abstract symbols that have no corresponding particular
experience and which behave according to rules of their own.'
However, the intellectual level
already contains empirical science. Including mathematics to the intellectual
level entails that the MOQ fails to distinguish between empirical and normative
science. This distinction is generally recognized in the philosophy of science.
Furthermore, it is unclear how
theories of empirical science should have no corresponding particular
Ant McWatt comments:
Because theories of empirical
science are concerned with corresponding experiences that are REPEATED (not
particular); that is to say “static patterns”.
Towards the end of the Copleston Annotations, Pirsig confirms this:
“In the MOQ repeated experience of
the pattern gives it its “thingness.” All sorts of ephemera pass in front
of the scientist’s eye but the patterns he values are those that repeat