Yes, I think a lot of the problems you're having here stems from the fact that you're NOT prioritizing LILA over ZMM.
Though ZMM is finished as a novel, it only includes a proto-MOQ. As a philosophy book about the MOQ, it's like looking at the early rough notes of a writer. As such, you need to be careful when you're using any philosophical part of it; especially those parts that contain SOM terminology or that Pirsig re-examined later on (post-1990).
In your post pasted below, you're still conflating (or ignoring) the two different epistemological and ontological senses of the words "subjective" and "objective". Though the terms are spelt the same way (and, no doubt, share a similar etymological heritage) they need to be regarded as completely different words. Keep in mind Northrop’s caution against presuming
that identical terms from different philosophical systems necessarily have the same meaning. For instance, the term
‘mind’ for Descartes and Locke refers to an internal mental substance (as distinct from an external material substance) while ‘mind’ for a Buddhist philosopher, of the Cittamatra tradition, refers to all apprehended factors (whether physical or mental) given in immediate awareness.
‘The philosophically important thing about any common-sense term
as it enters into any philosophical theory is not its bare dictionary meaning,
but the particular contextual meaning usually unique to the philosophical
system in question. Philosophical materialists, idealists, dualists and neutral
monists all admit the existence of what common sense denotes by the term
“mind,” yet there is all the difference in the world in the ways in which they
analyze and conceive of this datum.’
(F.S.C. Northrop, Logic of the Sciences & Humanities, 1947, p.80)
This is another reason why the use of brand new terminology (as found in the MOQ) can be helpful as it prevents this type of confusion. It keeps things clear and distinct. Unfortunately, once a writer is confused by terminology, the results often just end up being elegantly written nonsense.
Ant McWatt stated:
"By the way, its usage was only introduced in the 1995
“Einstein Magritte” Conference so the audience (largely unfamiliar with
Pirsig’s work) could get a better handle on what he was saying. For
anyone already familiar with LILA, it’s really not necessary (or even
ideal) to use this correlation between the four levels of static value
patterns with SOM's ideas of mind and matter."
"In what way was this handle supposed to be better for them?"
Ant McWatt responded:
Because the MOQ would be unfamiliar to them. It was a way for Pirsig to get the audience (many of which weren't even philosophers) up to speed with the MOQ.
Tuukka also asked:
> Is there some more specific reason for why it's not necessary or ideal to use
> this correlation between the four levels, other than it is
> uncomfortable, like a badly fitting shoe?
Ant McWatt comments:
The four static levels of the MOQ are value patterns that are evolving (in response to Dynamic Quality). In SOM mind and matter are meant be two different substances that aren't necessarily evolving. It remains a mystery how they interact. There's no proper recognition of social patterns in the latter and, of course, there's also (as Pirsig explains in LILA) no place for values. I don't know if the comparison between the four static levels of value patterns and SOM mind and matter should be even introduced to people unfamiliar with the MOQ as, in the long run, it can only confuse things for them. Other MOQ philosophy teachers might disagree here but that's my thoughts on the matter.
Tuukka stated April 20th:
> Tuukka stated April 13th 2012:
> My project, SOQ, is not an LS project. It's the project of me and a
> friend of mine. It obviously cannot compete with the ordinary,
> non-formal way of discussing the MOQ, because the language is too
> technical. By virtue of its approach, it's no more and no less the true
> MOQ than what you're used to. The MOQ may be expressed with English,
> Finnish, Chinese et cetera, so it may also be expressed with formal
> But maybe my work isn't needed. If I'm really going wrong here, could
> you solve these two problems for me, and set me on the right track?
> http://www.moq.fi/sets-of-quality/introduction/IInconsistent-Usage-of-Subjectivity >
> http://www.moq.fi/sets-of-quality/introduction/IIncluding-Mathematics-in-the-Intellectual-Level >
> Ant McWatt comments:
> I’ve had a look at the first problem that you mention here (and also in your post from today).
> You said:
> “If logos (objective quality) is like a tree, and mythos (subjective
> quality) is like a little shrub the tree once was, objective quality
> should emerge from subjective quality. But later, Pirsig published the
> SODV paper, in which he makes a contrary statement: that subjective
> quality (social, intellectual) emerges from objective quality
> (inorganic, biological).”
> Ant comments:
> The logos and mythos are both intellectual static patterns. In the MOQ of LILA, they are therefore both “subjective” in the ontological sense. And it is this ontological sense of mind& matter; subject& object that Pirsig uses post-LILA (e.g. in the Copleston Annotations and the SODV paper) when talking about relating SOM to the MOQ.
Why is logos subjective? Is there another reason than Pirsig saying so?
If there isn't, you are now prioritizing LILA over ZAMM, as Pirsig also
said other things. Logos is not subjective in any relevant way, except
the Buddhist "relative" way, popularized on MD by Marsha. The truths of
logos are interrelated to each other, and mean nothing outside the
context of that network of interrelated truths. This already is the
message of Quine's confirmation holism. But unlike the truths of mythos,
the truths of logos have a verifiable meaning within that network, and
hence, they are objective. Furthermore, no static truths have verifiable
meanings outside their context, as they don't exist outside the context.
I understand if "subjectivity" is thought of as a box, in which we can
put anything we want, we can just put logos there and leave it at that.
But that would be like running over ZAMM with LILA because the task to
make them resonate seemed difficult.
If physics is objective, and logos is not, what is the point of saying
Aristotle was being objective, when he defined force as something that
keeps bodies in motion, and that Galilei was also being objective, when
he defined force as something that causes changes in velocity and
acceleration, but is not a requirement for motion? Were both Aristotle
and Galilei being objective, because they were using a scientific
method? Were their scientific methods themselves subjective?
> By the way, its usage was only introduced in the 1995 “Einstein Magritte” Conference so the audience (largely unfamiliar with Pirsig’s work) could get a better handle on what he was saying. For anyone already familiar with LILA, it’s really not necessary (or even ideal) to use this correlation between the four levels of static value patterns with SOM's ideas of mind and matter.
In what way was this handle supposed to be better for them? Is there
some more specific reason for why it's not necessary or ideal to use
this correlation between the four levels, other than it is
uncomfortable, like a badly fitting shoe?
> The logos is only “objective” in the epistemological sense of the term (as Pirsig states in ZMM: The term logos, the root word of “logic,” refers to the sum total of our rational understanding of the world).
That definition does not seem to differentiate "epistemological
objectivity" from "objective quality". If it does to you, how?
> Tuukka stated April 19th 2012:
> ‘In his commentary on Frederick Copleston (http://robertpirsig.org/Copleston.htm)
> Pirsig uses the SODV interpretation in the first paragraph: "In the MOQ
> the term, "objective," is reserved for inorganic and biological
> patterns and cannot include "idealism." But later in the same text,
> he says: "Objective reality is the most valued intellectual construction."’
> Ant comments:
> Firstly, it's worth keeping in mind that when you see above sentence in context,
> you see Pirsig is using Copleston’s terminology i.e. in the relevant section:
> Copleston states: “For the world of ordinary experience is interpreted as a mental
> construction out of discrete impressions; and we have no way of knowing that
> the construction represents objective reality at all.”
> Then Pirsig comments: “Objective reality is the most valued intellectual construction.”
> And it becomes apparent from these two sentences that Pirsig is therefore talking about
> “objective reality” here in the epistemological sense of the term i.e. the best idea
> we can have to operate in the world effectively is to presume reality is largely independent
> from our control rather than a solipsistic figment of our imagination.
How is "epistemological objectivity", as in, "to presume reality is
largely independent from our control rather than a solipsistic figment
of our imagination," different from "objective quality"?