>> You are missing the general meaning of what I'm saying about explanation and truth statements.Almost
>> purposely. Probably because it undermines your ambitions.
I'm not misunderstanding nothing on purpose. Do you think I'd be so
stupid as to come to MD to assert my self-worth and persuade others to
believe I'm right, when I'm wrong? I could do a billion other things
than this. It's the philosophy itself that gives me the greatest
satisfaction, but I'm also compelled to make others have similar
thoughts as those of mine. I can tell you that I have been accused of
being a bad conversationalist, because I require such strong
justification for claims that some people don't understand how to
present such justification in the first place. Well, I can't help that.
Not much sense to water down one's standards and take delight in
dwelling in a dull complacency of intellectual vagueness accompanied by
a very mystic sense of betterness.
>> Tuukka earlier:
>> I understand if "subjectivity" is thought of as a box, in which we can
>> put anything we want, we can just put logos there and leave it at that.
>> But that would be like running over ZAMM with LILA because the task to
>> make them resonate seemed difficult.
>> Ron earlier: (this is Tuukka earlier actualy)
>> If physics is objective, and logos is not, what is the point of saying
>> Aristotle was being objective, when he defined force as something that
>> keeps bodies in motion, and that Galilei was also being objective, when
>> he defined force as something that causes changes in velocity and
>> acceleration, but is not a requirement for motion? Were both Aristotle
>> and Galilei being objective, because they were using a scientific
>> method? Were their scientific methods themselves subjective?
>> I never said logos is not objective. I said the opposite.
>> That's interesting because that's your own statement above not my own. Check.
>> Now you are contradicting your own statements. This raises the question of
>> whether or not you know what you are talking about, can you understand why
>> I might think that.
It doesn't say that. Read it many, many times again. Do I have to parse
it to you? Look, I don't even see where the supposed mistake is, because
you include several citations, and don't bother to specify the one
that's supposed to include the mistake. Do some work on your own, I'm
not going to *help* you accuse me. Give the exact sentence or paragraph.
Are you actually referring to this: "If physics is objective, and logos
is not... "? It doesn't say logos is not objective. It explains the
logical consequence, that would take place, if logos were objective. It
was a part of another discussion with Ant. Ant was saying, that logos is
subjective. I was trying to make the point that if logos is subjective,
but not also objective, we run into trouble. So I presented difficult
questions to Ant, which he or someone would have to answer, if logos
were not objective.
>> Ron earlier:
>> Aristotle was after clarity in meaning. He was dealing with the problem
>> of relativism also. The good is what makes some things better than others
>> it makes some things truer than others. Subjectivity is more like a pair of glasses
>> one interprets experience through. Thats why he wrote the "meta-physics"
>> you should read it some time.
>> Aristotle understood that scientific observation was a subjective enterprise.
>> All explanation is. The focus was on clarity in meaning, does the explanation
>> accurately provide meaning to the observation, how well does it explain
>> observable phenomena? How successful are it's predictions?
>> Tuukka,I highly recommend doing the homework. Research will
>> help out tremendously with alot of your questions.
>> Okay, but let's first make sure you know what I'm doing in the first place.
>> Ron replies:
>> What are you doing Tuukka? what does SOQ explain with greater clarity? what is it's
>> usefulness? how is it valuable?
The MOQ is not appealing to the academy. In its present form, it should
go to the domain of continental philosophy, because it's so vague, but
it isn't going there very well. I'm trying to make a formulation of the
MOQ that could be understood by the analytic philosopher, because the
good side in analytic philosophy is, that once you've said something,
that has a structure, everyone can examine that structure and it's much
harder to be biased against a theory due to some irrelevant reasons.
This is a way to get the MOQ to the academy. If you're fine with the MOQ
being outside the academy, my work does not concern you.
> If a nonrelativizably used predicate is introduced to a theory, the
> result is superficially similar to that theory being inconsistent. But
> on a closer look, something different takes place.
> In an inconsistent theory, the statement “The Moon is made of cheese” is
> both true and false...
A much better example than the predicate 'problem of induction' or
'everything that exists'.
Good! This used to be the first example I present to people, but as many didn't understand it, I tried different approaches. Apparently they were not better, and I had better stick to this for now.
Interesting, thank you. Maybe I should take that into account. It's not
a big deal - the most likely result will be that I should remove the
paragraphs about inconsistent systems. But as relevance logic seems
quite unusual currently, I'm not sure whether that's necessary. However,
I didn't know there are logic systems in which a contradiction does not
entail any statement.