Thanks for the reminder of Matt's comment - I'd forgotten - I admitted
at the time I hadn't yet understood it (I never have enough time to
follow-up all the avenues here). Two points
(1) I'm pretty sure Matt was not suggesting those 5 levels - the
quality outside (and pervading) the 4 levels is unpatterned - DQ in
other words. The Inorganic level of SPV's is not "fundamental" - just
the first division of static patterns emerging from the unpatterned
background - Northrop's undifferentiated aesthetic continuum.
(2) Bo's view was not "popular" - just a vocal and entirely
"defensive" few (but then he was under attack). The defense never had
anything to do with the arguments, and Bo sadly never listened to any
arguments - just hurled around abuse like "acolytes" at anyone trying
to engage in debate. He had (still has) a point, but he would never
allow anyone who cared to elaborate how "we" solve it. (that's an
inclusive we - him included).
I'm still very concerned (primarily concerned) with the evolution of
our future "intellects" beyond SOMism. The rest of the MoQ is history
- literally. (By the way - note the scare quotes - if people want to
reserve the word intellect for something narrower, then I'm OK with
that - I just mean "good use of our human faculties" - which is where
we all came in - what is good ?
People mustn't confuse the quality of debate with the volume of the
As before, bye and take care, but stay in touch.
On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 11:02 AM, Tuukka Virtaperko
> by speaking of a generalized "you" I spoke to the spirit of this forum that
> makes people express their support to me privately rather than publicly, on
> this forum. By doing so they could be doing me a favor. I don't want to get
> thrown out like Bo because my ideas were too popular. But there could be
> some problem with the spirit of this forum if advocacy of new ideas is best
> kept secret.
> About attribution, then. On 1.1.2012 at 16:22 (UTC +2) I have written a
> message, where I attribute the circular model to Matt, but I couldn't find
> the message in which Matt presents the suggestion. You seem to present a
> somewhat similar idea on 23.12.2011 at 10:57 (UTC +2):
> "Interesting Tuukka,
> Since "information" is the root of physics - the availability of
> something that can be patterned (or unpatterned) - I have no problem
> with that. One reason I've always rejected the idea that physics has a
> materialist base (except by convention).
> Similarly inorganic / organic split is confounded by our conventional
> material world view. To me inorganic just means not living - patterns
> that are unable to replicate and perpetuate themselves against the
> slide back to entropy. Memetic, genetic - makes no difference what the
> "material" is - so long as it's patternable information - hence no
> need for any mind-material type of duality.
> Your picture is pretty much where I've been, so I'll need to
> understand Matt's comment.
> Matt also said, on 23.12.2011 at 20:58 (UTC +2), that:
> If I followed your critical argument correctly, then you were
> suggesting that Pirsig needed to "develop a parallel system of
> patterns that would be idealistic" to offset his isolated attention to the
> classic picture of the universe furnished by an ascending line from
> physics to evolutionary biology to X (a placeholder for whatever it is
> that furnishes a picture of the social and intellectual).
> I think that is, more or less, right. Pirsig was lopsided in this respect,
> because what he needs alongside a picture of the universe that
> develops from the Big Bang to life on Earth in the Year of Our Lord
> Savior Jesus Christ 2011 (a "variant of emergent physicalism") is a
> picture of the development of those vocabularies that allow us to
> state that picture (a "parallel system of patterns that would be
> idealistic"). This would be the balancing of, as Dan might put it,
> materialism and idealism. (And so people don't become confused,
> these are special uses of "materialism" and especially "idealism,"
> but I think we need a special sense of "idealism" to try and come to
> grips with Pirsig's notion of the idea, or intellectual pattern, coming
> before matter.)
> However, that being said, my point in suggesting that your criticism of
> Pirsig is defused by Pirsig because, in the MoQ, it is a mistake to say
> that an "assumption that existence is fundamentally inorganic" is at
> work, is that I think you are wrong to think that "saying that
> something is Quality doesn't mean much" in the MoQ. True, it
> doesn't explain anything about the patterns themselves when we
> reach that level, but it precisely causes the assumption you stated to
> be invalid_because it is_ "an informative metaphysical statement" by
> telling us "what context we are thinking in." That context, as I put it,
> is the context in which everything is already understood to be
> normative, and so follow the rules of the normative.
> The_implications_ of that metaphysical stance, I think, are left
> underdeveloped (or at least, there is a lot of room for further growth
> in understanding how deep that stance penetrates and what
> implications it should and should not cause to our thinking). One
> implication is a balance between two systems, as you put it. But
> Pirsig 1) does provide the conceptual resources for understanding
> this to be the case and 2) does show cognizance of the need for the
> two systems by virtue of the other philosophical work he performs in
> ZMM and Lila. ZMM, after all, is the genealogical unearthing of the
> line of thought on the_idealist_ side of the equation that produces
> SOM's_reductive_ emergent physicalism. This is paralleled in Lila
> by his discourse, for example, on anthropology. The true
> lopsidedness of Pirsig's extant philosophical work, perhaps, is that on
> the idealist side, the side that deals with the history of humanity's
> attempts to develop ideas, it is mostly_deconstructive_, whereas on
> the materialist side, the side that deals with the nature of reality, it is
> both deconstructive and constructive (the deconstructive bits are his
> arguments against taking certain philosophical positions and the
> constructive bits are his metaphysical system-building).
> The special senses of "idealism" and "materialism" should be more
> fully apparent now. For if one uses a typical definition, it does
> appear that I've just suggested that the system of the Metaphysics of
> Quality, the "side that deals with the nature of reality," is materialist.
> But that's not the conceptual position of "materialism": so defined
> here,_every_ philosophical system should, for comprehensiveness,
> have an idealist side and a materialist side, and the materialist side
> defines the_material_ of reality. Descartes has two, res cogitans
> and res extensa (mind and matter). Pirsig has one: Quality. The
> material of reality in the MoQ is Quality, which means that it is
> normative, which means that it blocks attempts to reduce the
> normative to the non-normative ("reductive emergent physicalism")
> by finding underneath_everything_ the normative. _What this
> means_ needs to be further explained, yes; but the conceptual
> apparatus is already in place to block the inference that the MoQ
> assumes that "existence is fundamentally inorganic."
> If I understand correctly, this argument says the inorganic level is not the
> "fundamental category" of the MOQ, because, for example, static quality is
> definitely more fundamental. I was not being clear about what I meant with
> fundamental. Yet I do not find the MOQ to truly include a form of idealism
> because of the argument Matt presents here. The MOQ includes two somewhat
> separate theories: one of them is a general theory of emergence, with the
> static value patterns. Another one is more like a traditional metaphysical
> categorization, in which there are static, Dynamic, classic and romantic
> forms of quality. In the latter theory, Pirsig presents arguments that the
> static emerges from the Dynamic, but the Dynamic also somehow has to latch
> to static quality, which means that opportunities for the manifestation of
> Dynamic Quality emerge from certain configurations of static quality.
> Likewise, classic and romantic quality emerge from each other. This gives
> rise to an important difference between the general theory of emergence
> portion of the MOQ and the traditional metaphysical portion of the MOQ. The
> latter cannot be used as a general theory of emergence, because it does not
> define metaphysical categories in which we could not only say what emergence
> is, but also what it is not.
> Therefore, the notion of emergence is largely irrelevant in the traditional
> metaphysical portion of the MOQ. That portion of the MOQ features no
> category pair which could not be argued to emerge from the other. Only the
> theory of levels of static value does so. For example, we may not argue that
> the biological level emerges straight from the social, that is, that the
> emergence would go backwards.
> This is why I don't find it satisfactory to say that the MOQ includes
> idealism in the traditional metaphysical portion, and materialism in the
> general theory of emergence portion. In order to include idealism in such a
> way that mental constructs can be compared to materialistic constructs, the
> constructs have to be defined within the same theory. This means they should
> also be expressed as levels of static value. The traditional metaphysical
> portion of the MOQ resembles, to some extent, a metatheory of the general
> theory of emerge portion of the MOQ, and those metatheoretic entities cannot
> be contrasted with the object level entities of the general theory of
> Furthermore, when I included both materialism and idealism to the object
> level theory (the general theory of emergence), that inclusion cannot be
> contrasted with having materialism in the general theory of emergence, and
> idealism in the metaphysical theory. I presented the inclusion *within* the
> object-level theory, and the inclusion could not possibly retain a similar
> meaning if somehow "transported" or "expanded" to the metatheory level. I
> don't think the metatheory is idealistic or materialistic. In Pirsig's
> lingo, the metatheory is about Quality, and I have no problem with that. The
> object level theory is about static quality. The difference is quite clear.
> When I said that the MOQ should include both materialism and idealism, I
> meant it should include them as static quality. What Matt seems to be saying
> there is that it includes them as Quality. That probably makes some sense,
> but I want to express both material and mental objects within a general
> theory of emergence, and Matt's way of seeing things here does not
> facilitate that. Surely he is not saying that there are five levels, like
> this: static, inorganic, biological, social, intellectual.
> Moq_Discuss mailing list
> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives:
> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list
Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.